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Abstract: One of Jerry Fodor’s many seminal contributions to philosophy of mind was his inner 
sentence theory of belief and desire. To believe that p is to have a subpersonal inner sentence in 
one’s “belief-box” that means that p, and to desire that q is to have a subpersonal inner sentence in 
one’s “desire-box” that means that q. I will distinguish between two accounts of box-inclusion that 
exhaust the options: liberal and restrictive. I will show that both accounts have the mistaken im-
plication that in certain cases there can be radical but “secret” changes in a subject’s beliefs and 
desires. I will suggest that the correct moral to draw is that we should instead accept what Eric 
Schwitzgebel has called a “surface-level” theory of belief and desire.  
 
One of Jerry Fodor’s many seminal contributions to philosophy of mind was 
his inner sentence theory of belief and desire. To believe that p is to have a 
subpersonal inner sentence in one’s “belief-box” that means that p, and to de-
sire that q is to have a subpersonal inner sentence in one’s “desire-box” that 
means that q. The metaphor of “boxes” is to be spelled out in functional terms, 
but the details are typically not supplied.1  
I will develop an argument against the inner sentence theory. The argu-
ment takes the form of a dilemma. Briefly, I will distinguish between two pos-
sible accounts of box-inclusion: liberal and restrictive. I will show that liberal 
accounts deliver the mistaken verdict of secret scrambling in certain hypothet-
ical cases. By contrast, restrictive accounts deliver the equally mistaken verdict 
of secret losing in those hypothetical cases. In fact, restrictive accounts are a 
non-starter because they deliver mistaken verdicts in actual cases.  
I suggest that the moral of the argument is that we should instead accept 
what Schwitzgebel has called a “surface-level” theory of belief and desire. 
Examples include the phenomenal-dispositional theory (Schwitzgebel 2001, 
2002, 2013) and a suitable interpretationist theory (e. g. Lewis 1974, Williams 
2016, 2020). Like myself, Schwitzgebel develops an argument from cases 
against the inner sentence theory and for a surface-level approach to belief 
and desire (2001, 2002, 2013). My argument will differ from his and will, I 
 
* I am grateful to . . . . 
 
1 See Fodor (1975, 1978, 1986, 1987), Field (1978) and Schiffer (1981). Fodor (1975) held that 
the inner sentence theory also applies to animals who do not speak a public language. See 
Beck (2017) for a recent discussion of this issue. I take the name “inner sentence theory” from 
Fodor 1978.  
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hope, contribute to the case against the inner sentence theory and for a sur-
face-level approach.2  
Those who hold on to the inner sentence theory in the face of my dil-
lemma must identify which horn of the dilemma they favor. Even those will-
ing to “bite the bullet” will find something of value in my argument. I hope 
that my argument may draw more attention to the important issue of the con-
ditions for “box-inclusion”.  
In §1, I formulate an initial, liberal version of the inner sentence theory. 
In §2, I argue that it implies “secret scrambling” in certain cases. In §3, I argue 
that a restrictive of the inner sentence theory may avoid secret scrambling but 
it implies “secret losing” and is otherwise problematic. In §4, I formulate the 
official argument. In §5, I draw some morals.  
 
1. A SIMPLE VERSION OF THE INNER SENTENCE THEORY 
 
Fodor believed that each of us has a neurally-realized, subpersonal language 
of thought (“mentalese”). He argued for this hypothesis on the grounds that 
it provides the best explanation of the systematicity and the productivity of 
thought (see e. g. 1987, appendix). He held (1975, 66–79) that we do not ever 
experience or think about the hidden inner sentences of this language. And 
he proposed:  
 
[1] The Basic Theory. To believe that p is to have a subpersonal inner 
sentence in one’s “belief-box” that means that p, and to desire that q is to 
have a subpersonal LOT sentence in one’s “desire-box” that means that 
q.  
 
This requires unpacking.  
First, meaning. I take the inner sentence theory to be neutral on how ex-
actly the meanings of inner sentences are initially determined. Fodor himself 
accepted an “asymmetric dependence” theory for subsentential mentalese ex-
pressions. Then the grammar (itself somehow physically-determined) fixes 
the meanings of whole inner sentences. Other views are possible. However, I 
will take the inner sentence to be committed to 
 
[2] Inertia of meaning. Once the meaning of an inner sentence is initially 
fixed by way of connections to the world, it tends to retain that meaning 
whenever it is tokened in the belief-box or the desire-box, even when it 
is temporarily severed from its normal connections to perceptual inputs 
and behavioral outputs (Fodor 1986, 12-15) 
 
2 Briefly, Schwitzgebel’s main argument concerns “in-between believing”. By contrast, mine 
involves “secret scrambling” and “secret losing”. Moreover, Schwitzgebel’s argument, my ar-
gument takes the form of a dilemma which engages with the issue of box-inclusion that his 
discussion neglects (see footnote 6 below for more on the differences between my argument 
and Schwitzgebel).  
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As an illustration, Fodor notes you might acquire the delusional, false belief 
that an inanimate item “is alive” and start to take care of it (“companion de-
lusion”). Or again, Williamson (2007, 259) points out that revisionary meta-
physician might withhold ordinary predicates (“is a mountain”) from para-
digm examples, and we take it that their “mountain”-beliefs are in error. Such 
errors require that the meaning of a mentalese term is not radically fickle; 
once it acquires its meaning it retains that meaning despite temporary aber-
rations in use.3 True, holistic “inferential role theories” of meaning deny this; 
but Fodor staunchly opposed holism and considered content to be independ-
ent of inferential liaisons.  
Next, what suffices for an inner sentence to be in your “belief-box” or “de-
sire-box”? Fodor was mostly silent on this neglected question. In general, 
while much has been written about what it is for an internal sentence to mean 
that p (“psychosemantics”), there has been relatively little discussion of what 
it is for an inner sentence to be in the belief-box or the desire-box. One of my 
central aims is to bring it to the fore. 
Before looking at this question, a clarification. My talk of a “belief-box” 
and a “desire-box” should not be taken too literally. The inner sentence theory 
is only committed to the claim that to believe that p is to stand in a function-
ally-characterizable relation R to an inner sentence that means that p. To say 
that a subject x has inner sentence y in her “belief-box” is just to say that x 
stands in relation R to inner sentence y. Understood this way, talk of a belief-
box is not committed to a single, undifferentiated store (Quilty-Dunn and 
Mandelbaum 2018).  
With this clarification out of the way, we can return to our question: what 
suffices for an inner sentence to be in your “belief-box” or “desire-box”? 
Fodor and Lepore (1992, 116) tentatively suggest one sufficient condition for 
box-inclusion: “beliefs, in the course of contributing to the etiology of behav-
ior, interact with desires according to some decision theory or other”. (See 
also Fodor 1987, 69 and Mandelbaum 2014, 82.) That is:   
 
[3] One of the sufficient conditions for “box-inclusion” is: If subpersonal 
inner sentences b1, b2, . . . and d1, d2, . . . typically (ceteris paribus) interact 
to cause the actions which, according to b1, b2, . . ., will satisfy d1, d2, . . ., 
then inner sentences b1, b2, . . . are “in the belief-box” and inner sentences 
d1, d2, . . .  are “in the desire-box”.  
 
In fact, there is a simple argument for thinking that Fodorians should ac-
cept [3]. (i) Charlie the chimp uses a stick to get termites from a hole in a tree. 
He believes if I put this stick down that hole I will get those termite-like things 
and desires I will get those termite-like things. (ii) So Fodorians must say that 
the underlying inner sentences count as being in the chimp’s belief-box and 
 
3 Fodor 1987, 93 allowed that long-term changes in use eventually result in changes in mean-
ing.  
                                                                                                                         Draft 
 4 
desire-box. (iii) The Means-End condition [3], understood as a sufficient con-
dition, delivers this result, and there is no alternative plausible sufficient con-
dition that is satisfied in this primitive case.  
Proponents of the inner sentence theory who reject Means-End condition 
[3] as a sufficient condition for box-inclusion must specify an alternative 
plausible sufficient condition that is satisfied in this primitive case. It’s hard to 
see what that might be.   
 Notice that [3] is only the very weak claim that Means-End is one suffi-
cient condition for box-inclusion. No doubt proponents of the inner sentence 
will add other sufficient conditions to [3], involving for instance being impli-
cated in planning and reasoning, that are satisfied in the case of more sophis-
ticated thinkers like ourselves (Field 1978, 13).  
Let us, then, provisionally suppose the inner sentence theory to be com-
mitted to [1]-[3]. And let us call it a liberal inner sentence theory, since it 
doesn’t place especially strong constraints (e. g. rationality constraints) on 
box-inclusion (I will say more about my sense of “liberal” in §3). It therefore 
fits with Fodor’s own opposition to such constraints (1987, 88-89). I don’t say 
Fodor himself definitely accepted it. But it’s a good place to start.   
A final point. There are different ways of understanding the inner sen-
tence theory. As is well-known, Fodor (1987, chap. 1) takes it to be a vindica-
tion of commonsense realism about belief and desire. He is a staunch realist 
about beliefs and desires (contrary to “eliminative materialists”). He says 
(1987, 24) that a vindication of realism must agree with commonsense ver-
dicts about our beliefs and desires in core cases. And he holds that the inner 
sentence theory is a vindication of realism in this sense (1987, 16, 24). In line 
with this, he is concerned to answer various alleged counterexamples to his 
account – alleged cases in which it yields counterintuitive verdicts about men-
tal content (e. g. 1987, 92-93; 1990, 100-117). On a quite different way of un-
derstanding the inner sentence theory, it is neutral on common sense realism 
about belief and desire. In fact, it shouldn’t be formulated as a theory about 
what it is to believe or desire something at all. Rather, it is merely the weak 
claim that there exist some interesting states – relations to inner sentences – 
that can be mentioned in the explanation of behavior.   
I am interested in the adequacy of the inner sentence theory understood 
in the first way. I like to think that we believe things and desire things. Such 
facts are not fundamental. As Fodor memorably put it, “if intentionality is 
real, it must really be something else” (1987, 97). So I am interested the inner 
sentence theory as a proposal about how the facts about our beliefs and desires 
might be pinned down by more basic facts in core cases. (Compare how 
Kripke’s (1980) causal theory of reference for proper names is a theory about 
such reference is pinned down by more basic facts.) My aim here is to evaluate 
the theory when understood in this way.  
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2. THE LIBERAL INNER SENTENCE THEORY IMPLIES SECRET SCRAMBLING 
 
Suppose a dog bites your leg and you intentionally and vigorously attempt to 
pull your leg away. You desire that the pain go away and believe that doing 
this will achieve that. Many other “twisted” interpretations fit your behavior 
equally well but are incorrect: for instance, that you want your pain to increase 
and believe that moving your leg this way will achieve that (Lewis 1983, 374-
375; 1986, 38; Williamson 2007, 253ff; Williams 2016 and 2020).  
I will argue that inner sentence theory [1]-[3] of how content incorrectly 
predicts that, in certain cases, such a perverse (mis-)interpretation would ac-
tually momentarily become true of you (your beliefs and desires would actu-
ally become scrambled), while there is absolutely no accessible, person-level 
change in your experiences or dispositions to act under any circumstances.  
Case 1: Color Case. Suppose that you are one of our prelinguistic hominid 
ancestors: you are smart but you lack public (outer) language (and so inner 
speech as well). (Focusing on an individual without a public language will help 
me keep the case simple.) Some scientists decide to perform a simple psycho-
physical experiment. You are withheld food. Then you are shown two color 
chips over and over; sometimes they have the same color and sometimes dif-
ferent colors. You are given cheese whenever you press on the button while 
the apparent colors are distinct and you get an electric shock whenever you 
press while the apparent colors are the same. You are then shown a red chip 
and a green chip a few times in a row, and press on the button. (See Figure 1.) 
Each time you believe that the apparent colors are distinct and that if you press 
when they are distinct you will receive some cheese, and you desire that you 




Figure 1: a red color chip and a green color chip 
 
Fodorians will apply their inner sentence theory to this case (as well as the 
other cases to be presented). Fodor held that the inner sentence theory applies 
in “core cases”. He said that those are cases in which there are “causally effi-
cacious attitude tokenings”; his motto is “No Intentional Causation without 
Explicit Representation” (1987, p. 25). Fodorians will say that the Color Case 
is clearly a “core case” in this sense. It is an example of intentional causation 
in which your belief and desire cause your behavior.4 So they will apply the 
 
4 There are some philosophers – for instance, “interpretationists” about beliefs and desires – 
who will generally deny beliefs and desires are inner states that are causally efficacious in the 
production of behaviour. Such philosophers might deny that in the Color case you belief and 
desire cause your behaviour. But I am interested in what Fodorians will say about the case. 
Fodorians believe in intentional causation. And they will say that the Color Case is a para-
digmatic case of intentional causation. 
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inner sentence theory to this case. In fact, Fodor explicitly applies the inner 
sentence theory to such cases of prelinguistic belief and desire (1978, 512; 
1987, 53).5   
So, on the inner sentence theory, here is what is going on in these initial 
trials of the Color Case. Although you lack an outer, public language, there 
are in your belief-box two subpersonal inner sentences: “the apparent colors 
are distinct” and “if I press on the button when the apparent colors are distinct 
I will receive cheese”; and there is in your desire-box the subpersonal sentence 
“I will receive cheese”. (Of course, in fact they are nothing like English.) They 
cause you to press on the button.  
For the sake of argument, suppose that the inner sentence theory is correct 
in this case. In fact, let us assume that the liberal inner sentence theory [1]-[3] 
is correct. Recall that this consists of the basic theory, semantic inertia (inner 
sentences can be “moved around” while retaining their meanings) and the 
means-end condition as one sufficient condition for box-inclusion.  
But now suppose that, in a final trial, you are shown the same red and 
green color chips. We stipulate that your first-person experiences, behavior 
and behavioral dispositions, and overall functional organization are exactly 
the same as in previous trials. The only difference is that, because of a mal-
function between your “experience-box” and your “belief-box”, they have a 
different subpersonal realization. Proponents of the liberal inner sentence 
theory would describe it as follows: what goes into your belief-box are the in-
ner sentences “the apparent colors are the same” and “if I press the button 
while the apparent colors are the same I will receive cheese”; and as before “I 
will receive cheese” goes into your desire-box. (Recall that I am assuming se-
mantic inertia, so that inner sentences can be “moved around” while retaining 
their meanings.) Your belief-box is momentarily “misspeaking” but, since the 
differences “cancel out”, your behavioral dispositions (and your experiences) 
remain the same. 
Two clarifications. (i) The example does not involve all of your LOT sen-
tences being scrambled in some systematic way; it only requires local scram-
bling. (ii) Keep in mind that in this example you are meant to be one of our 
pre-linguistic hominids. A fortiori, in this example, when your inner sentences 
are scrambled, there will not be any differences in your speech dispositions (e. 
g. you will not suddenly be disposed to utter the English sentence “the appar-
ent colors are the same”), nor any differences in your susceptibility to semantic 
priming, and so on. In general, I am just stipulating that, between the initial 
trials and the final trial, there are no differences in your personal-level expe-
riences or outer dispositions under any circumstances (counterfactual condi-
tional are also preserved). Since the case is hypothetical, I am free to make 
such a stipulation.  
 
5  See Camp 2009 and Beck 2017 for relevant discussion. 
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Given my stipulations about the case, the liberal inner sentence theory [1]-
[3] entails secret scrambling. True, everything from the inside is the same as in 
previous trials. Look at Figure 1 again to help you imagine the situation from 
the first person. You have the same experience as of totally different colors 
(red and green), and this guides you in pressing the button. So, for all the 
world, it seems that you once again believe that the apparent colors are distinct. 
Nevertheless, the inner sentence theory [1]-[3] implies that you “really” now 
secretly and irrationally mistakenly believe that the apparent colors are exactly 
the same. For, by [3] Means-End, though the inner sentences (“the apparent 
colors are the same”, etc.) are scrambled, they still count as being in your be-
lief-box and desire-box, since they interact with one another to cause your be-
havior in the manner distinctive of beliefs and desires (compare Charlie the 
chimp with the stick). Further, by [2] Semantic Inertia, they retain their usual 
meanings, despite being temporarily aberrantly connected to the world (as in 
the examples from §1).6 Finally, by [1] the Basic Theory, there has been a seis-
mic and irrational change in your color belief. This is true despite the fact that 
all your conscious experiences, and all your dispositions to engage in con-
sciously-accessible behaviors, remain exactly the same.  
We will see in §3 that some Fodorians may wish to move to a restrictive 
form of the inner sentence theory that avoids the verdict of secret scrambling. 
All I am saying now is that, given my stipulations about the case, the liberal 
inner sentence theory [1]-[3] undeniably implies this verdict.7  
This verdict is incorrect. Fundamentally, there is just a temporary change 
in the neurally-realized vehicles. Above I pretended they are English sentences, 
 
6 As noted in §1, inner sentence theorists need the inertia of meaning to handle actual cases 
of error due to “aberrant use”. Inner sentences can be “moved around” while retaining their 
meanings. Consistency demands that they say that semantic inertia holds in the present case 
too. For instance, when “same apparent color” is aberrantly tokened in in your head in re-
sponse to an experience as of different apparent colors (Figure 1), it still means same apparent 
color. Against this, proponents of a “holistic conceptual role theory” might say that that it 
suddenly now means different apparent color. On such a theory, any change in “use” might 
result in a change in content. But it’s unclear how such a theory might handle error. And, in 
any case, it would be far from Fodor’s own anti-holistic theory which is my target here; it 
would be closer to the kind of holistic “conceptual role theory” that Fodor staunchly opposed.  
 
7 To show that a version of the inner sentence theory implies strange verdicts about what you 
believe, it is not enough to describe a case where an aberrant internal sentence is tokened in 
your head. In addition, we must show that the inner sentence satisfies the conditions for 
belief-box-inclusion. I think that a drawback of Schwitzgebel’s interesting discussion (2013, 
83) is that he ignores this issue. Fodorians can respond by saying that in his cases the relevant 
aberrant sentences don’t count as being in the belief box. Utilizing the Lewis-Williams-Wil-
liamson point about underdetermination, I have shown that in certain cases your inner sen-
tences can indeed be scrambled while at the same time satisfying the conditions for box-inclu-
sion laid out by the liberal inner sentence theory [1]-[3]. And in §3 I will show that restrictive 
forms of the inner sentence theory face different but equally serious problems. The result is 
a novel dilemma for the Fodorian theory. This specific dilemma has not been presented in 
the literature.  
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but of course they are nothing like English. As it might be, the neural symbols 
@# are momentarily replaced by some other neural symbols &#. The inter-
change totally preserves functional organization. Whether your belief has 
changed is up for grabs. In my view, we should treat this as an example of 
alternative realization of the same mental state. Again, look at Figure 1, so that 
you can imagine being in this situation. In the fourth trial, as in the previous 
ones, the apparent colors (red and green) are obviously distinct to you. You 
attend to their difference. This causes you to press the button, and get the 
cheese. Given the totality of basic facts about this situation, the right verdict, 
once again, is that you believe the apparent colors to be distinct, despite the 
different neural realizer.8 The liberal inner sentence theory [1]-[3] is mistaken. 
Of course, it’s always possible to “bite the bullet”. Proponents of the liberal 
inner sentence theory [1]-[3] could just accept secret scrambling. For myself, 
I want to say that we just know this verdict to be incorrect. (Compare: we just 
know that you cannot make a beautiful painting become ugly just by changing 
its hidden microstructure, without making any changes to any of its surface-
level, accessible features.) But I would be content with a weaker claim: this 
case provides at least some reason to reject the liberal inner sentence theory 
[1]-[3] and to seek an alternative theory that avoids secret scrambling.  
Case 2: Taste Case. You are one of our prelinguistic hominid ancestors. 
You are starving, and you are given vanilla ice-cream for the first time (with-
out knowing what it is). You believe that this white stuff tastes sweet and good 
and want this sweet, good-tasting stuff in your mouth. This causes you to de-
vour it for five minutes until it is all gone – a case of intentional causation. 
Assume, for the sake of argument, a subpersonal language of thought. Mostly, 
everything is normal. However, starting at time t, there is a temporary, 10-
second malfunction: while everything stays the same in your taste-system re-
sponsible for your total taste experience, further downstream you temporally 
undergo a neural re-organization that the inner sentence would describe as 
follows: the subpersonal sentence “this tastes horribly bitter and disgusting” is 
tokened in your belief-box and “I will have this specific bitter, disgusting stuff 
in my mouth” goes in your desire-box. During this short interval, your taste-
experience of the ice-cream (at the level of affective as well as sensory phe-
nomenology), as well as your disposition to stuff it in your mouth, remain 
exactly the same. However, the liberal inner sentence theory [1]-[3] implies 
that, for this short 10-second interval, you suddenly, and for no reason, se-
cretly acquired a new, irrational and totally false belief about the ice-cream (it 
tastes horribly bitter and disgusting) as well as a crazy desire (to have this spe-
 
8 One of my stipulations is that in this case – and the cases below – is that your conscious 
experiences remain the same. Fodor himself did not much discuss conscious experience (ex-
cept to say that no one has the slightness idea about how material things can have it). Still, he 
of course recognized its reality. And this is all I need to run the cases.  
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cific disgusting stuff in your mouth). You momentarily cycle between a nor-
mal belief-desire psychology and a crazy one. But we must reject this verdict. 
By stipulation, your wonderful (sensory and affective) experience of the ice-
cream stays exactly the same in phenomenal character, and you are disposed 
to stuff it in your mouth. Throughout you evidently believe it tastes good (not 
disgusting), and you want this good stuff in your mouth, even if these mental 
states are differently realized by symbols at the subpersonal neural level. At 
the very least, we have some reason to reject the verdict of secret scrambling 
in this case.9  
Case 3: Large Number. You are a very primitive hunter-gatherer without 
public language. You can only visually recognize (“subitize”) exact numbers 
up to about four or five. However, somehow you also have a subpersonal 
“number sense” akin to a form of clairvoyance. Maybe scientists implanted it 
in your brain; or maybe it is part of your idiosyncratic biological endowment. 
Oddly, your number sense is limited to detecting only one state of affairs: the 
presence of exactly 117 things behind your head. And you have in your men-
talese lexicon only one representation of a large exact number, namely, “117”. 
Occasionally, unknown to you, a collection of exactly 117 things is placed di-
rectly behind your head; and, thanks to your “number sense”, when this hap-
pens, the subpersonal inner sentence “there are exactly 117 things behind my 
head” is stored in your belief-box. Many psychosemantic theories imply that 
it “represents” that there are exactly 117 things behind my head. However, you 
have no experience of this process: no experience of 117 things behind your 
head, and no experience of the inner sentence. Also suppose that, whenever 
there are exactly 117 things right behind your head, some sentences also go 
into your desire-box, like “when there are 117 things behind my head I will 
scratch my ear” and “when there are 117 things behind my head I will walk 
straight ahead”. Together, these inner sentences cause you to scratch your ear 
and begin to walk forward. 
The liberal inner sentence theory [1]-[3] implies that, on these occasions, 
you acquire a belief that is true iff there are 117 things exactly behind you, even 
though you are a primitive hunter-gatherer with no person-level means of rep-
resenting large numbers (e. g. no public language representing large numbers) 
and no experiences of what his behind you. Fodor (1987, 89) conjectured that 
such “anti-holistic” verdicts might be derived from his theory, but he didn’t 
provide the details. My example here shows such verdicts may indeed by de-
rived from the liberal inner sentence theory [1]-[3]. Of course, proponents of 
 
9 Here is a sketch of a more extreme case. Williams (2016, 2020) describes an ingenious per-
verse “bubble” (mis)interpretation of all of a subject’s beliefs and desires. The interpretation 
nevertheless preserves the subject’s means-end rationality and “structural” rationality more 
generally. I think it could be shown that the liberal inner sentence theory [1]-[3] has the ab-
surd implication that at twelve-noon today (say) the insane “bubble” interpretation could 
momentarily become true of you for a short period without your noticing or changing at all 
in any of your experiences or behavioral dispositions because of a hidden global permutation 
of your hidden LOT inscriptions.  
                                                                                                                         Draft 
 10 
the inner sentence theory might just accept the verdict that in this case you 
occasionally acquire a belief that is true iff there are 117 things exactly behind 
you. But I think we know this verdict to be incorrect in this case. After all, on 
these occasions, you have no idea of what is happening right behind your 
head. But then you don’t believe that there are 117 things there, even if you 
have a subpersonal representation carrying this information. At the very least, 
we have more reason to reject this verdict than to accept the liberal inner sen-
tence theory [1]-[3]. 
When a theory delivers many counterintuitive verdicts, at some point we 
should give it up. For example, a simple analysis of knowledge as justified true 
belief faces a host of counterexamples involve epistemic luck (Gettier 1963). 
And the description theory of reference faces the famous series of counterex-
amples described by Kripke (1980). If you agree that we should reject these 
theories because of their many counterintuitive consequences, shouldn’t you 
also agree that we should reject the liberal inner sentence theory [1]-[3] be-
cause of its many counterintuitive consequences in the kinds of cases I have 
described? At the very least, I have given a novel reason to doubt the LIBERAL 
inner sentence theory [1]-[3].  
 
3. COULD A PLAUSIBLE RESTRICTIVE INNER SENTENCE THEORY AVOID SE-
CRET SCRAMBLING? 
 
As I define the “inner sentence theory”, it is at least committed to the basic 
theory [1] and semantic inertia [2]. The only moving part concerns box-inclu-
sion. The inner sentence theory examined in the previous sections, which 
combines [1] and [2] with [3], is an example of:  
 
Liberal Version. The correct theory of box-inclusion is lib-
eral, in the sense that it implies the aberrant inner sentences 
in the above examples count as being in your belief-box and 
desire-box.  
 
This means that it implies secret and irrational belief-desire change in my ex-
amples.  
At this point, other proponents of the inner sentence theory might give up 
the Liberal Version and move to:  
 
Restrictive Version: The correct theory of box-inclusion is re-
strictive (as it might be, incorporates “rationality con-
straints”), in the sense that it implies the scrambled inner 
sentences in the previous examples do not count as being in 
your belief-box and desire-box, even though they satisfy the 
means-end condition [3].  
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To illustrate, consider the Taste Case. Recall that there is a 10-second in-
terval in your five-minute chow-down of the ice-cream when, by some glitch, 
the subpersonal inner sentences “the ice-cream tastes horribly bitter and dis-
gusting” and “I will have this horribly bitter and disgusting stuff in my mouth” 
are tokened in your head. However, throughout you retain the same delicious, 
sweet taste-experience of the ice-cream and the disposition to stuff it in your 
mouth. According to the Restrictive Version, these aberrant inner sentences 
do not count as being in your belief-box and desire-box. The idea is that, alt-
hough they satisfy the “means-end” condition (they interact with one another 
to cause your behavior in the manner distinctive of beliefs and desires), they 
fail to satisfy certain more restrictive constraints on box-inclusion.  
For instance, on one natural version of the Restrictive Version, the aber-
rant inner sentence “this stuff tastes bitter and disgusting” fails be in your be-
lief-box because it fails to satisfy the Evidence Constraint: if an inner sentence 
(e. g.) is radically incongruent with your experiential evidence (e. g. your taste-
experience of the ice-cream), it cannot count as being in your belief-box. And 
the aberrant inner sentence “I will have this horribly bitter and disgusting stuff 
in my mouth” fails to satisfy the Desire-the-Good Constraint: if an inner sen-
tence is incongruent with any sane set of intrinsic values, it cannot count as 
being in your desire-box (compare Lewis 1994, 427). 
In this way, the Restrictive Version would avoid secret scrambling: the ver-
dict that you suddenly believe that the ice-cream tastes horribly bitter and dis-
gusting and that you suddenly have the perverse desire that you will have this 
horribly bitter and disgusting stuff in your mouth.10   
 
10 I have said that the textual evidence strongly suggests that Fodor probably would have 
accepted the Liberal Version, and would have accept its consequence of secret scrambling in 
my examples. What about contemporary followers of Fodor? Take, for instance, Quilty-
Dunn and Mandelbaum’s (2018) sophisticated defense of a Fodorian view. Concerning what 
it takes for an inner sentence to be in the “belief box”, they write (2018: 2370), “beliefs are 
acquired ballistically and automatically, put subjects into a negatively valenced motivational 
state when encountering disconfirming evidence, will increase in strength over time . . .” (see 
also “The science of belief: a progress report”). Does this suggest a Liberal Version of the 
inner sentence theory which implies secret scrambling in some possible cases (the version 
suggested by Fodor’s remarks), or does it suggest a Restrictive Version that avoids this im-
plication?  
       There is some reason to think it implies the Restrictive Version. Consider, for instance, 
my Color Case. In the final trial, even though you experience distinct colors, the aberrant 
inner sentence “the apparent colors are the same” is tokened in your head and helps to con-
trol your behaviour, thereby satisfy the Means-End condition. It can be assumed to satisfy all 
of Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum’s conditions, but for the condition about negative valence: 
for, while “the apparent colors are the same” is tokened in your head, you are presented with 
evidence that the colors are different, and yet you don’t undergo a negatively valenced moti-
vational state (for by stipulation your experience and behaviors are the same as in previous 
trials). So if Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum hold that the negative valence condition is a 
strictly necessary condition on belief, then their view implies that the aberrant sentence “the 
apparent colors are the same” does not count as being in your belief box. That is, they advo-
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But the Restrictive Version implies secret losing. For it holds that, during 
the short interval, the aberrant inner sentence “this stuff tastes bitter and dis-
gusting” doesn’t count as being in your belief-box. And, we can suppose, there 
is no other inner sentence in your belief-box about the taste of the ice-cream. 
A fortiori, during this short interval, no sentence about the taste of the ice-
cream is immediately entailed by any sentence in your belief-box. That is, no 
sentence about its taste is “implicitly stored” in your belief-box in the sense of 
Field 1978 and Lycan 1986. Therefore, the Restrictive Version implies that, 
during the short interval, even though there is no change in your wonderful 
and sweet taste-experience of the ice-cream or your tendency to stuff it in your 
mouth, you inexplicably and irrationally entirely lose any (“explicit” or “im-
plicit”) belief about the taste of this ice-cream. This is so even just before and 
after you believe it tastes sweet and good because just before and after “it tastes 
sweet and good” is in your belief-box.11 Likewise, the Restrictive Version also 
implies that, during this short interval, you lack any desire about the ice-
cream, even though just before and after you desired to eat it.  
But these verdicts are also incorrect. Throughout you evidently believe it 
tastes good, without any brief interval of agnosticism. And throughout you de-
sired to eat it.12 
 
cate a Restrictive Version that avoids secret scrambling in this case. Maybe they could like-
wise avoid secret scrambling in the Taste Case. (I am not sure what they would say about the 
Large Number Case.)  
       But, on this interpretation of their view, it faces the problems I raised in §3 for any Re-
strictive Version. First, it implies secret losing in the Color Case and the Taste Case – which 
is just as bad as secret scrambling. Second, it is overly restrictive in other cases. Mentally ill 
people believe things but don’t experience negative affect when presented with disconfirming 
evidence. Further, simple animals have beliefs but it is not plausible that they all experience 
negative affect when presented with disconfirming evidence. (Also, even if actual cases don’t 
fill the bill, we can imagine wholly dispassionate believers.) 
      Perhaps they will say that the negative valence condition is ceteris paribus and doesn’t 
apply in the case of the mentally-ill person because of malfunction. But in that case it also 
doesn’t apply in the Color Case because there is malfunction in this case too. And then their 
view doesn’t block the problematic verdict of secret scrambling after all. 
 
11 Here is an analogy. Suppose that first you believe it will rain tomorrow, then for some 
reason you momentarily lose that belief and become agnostic, and then finally you again 
believe it will rain tomorrow. On the inner sentence theory, this is grounded in the fact that 
first “it will rain tomorrow” is in your belief-box, then briefly it is not in your belief-box (and 
nor is any sentence which immediately entails anything about the weather tomorrow), and 
finally “it will rain tomorrow” is back in your belief-box. Given the Restrictive Version of the 
inner sentence theory, this is exactly what happens with the inner sentence “this stuff tastes 
sweet and wonderful” in my case. So it has the parallel implication in this case, namely that 
you momentarily lose any belief about the taste of the ice-cream while just before and after 
believing it to be sweet and good.  
 
12 A restrictive theory might also endorse a Holistic Inference Constraint: if an isolated LOT 
sentence (e. g. “there are 117 things behind me”) tokened in your head doesn’t tend to cause 
the tokening of other sentences that it inferentially supports (e. g. “there are more than 4 
things behind me”), then it doesn’t count as being in your belief-box. So, a restrictive theory 
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I have just argued that the Restrictive Version mistakenly entails secret 
losing in my examples. There is another argument against the Restrictive Ver-
sion. The Restrictive Version says that the correct theory of box-inclusion is 
restrictive, in the sense that it implies that the inner sentences “this stuff tastes 
bitter and disgusting” and “I will have this horribly bitter and disgusting stuff 
in my mouth” do not count as being in your belief-box and desire-box, even 
though they satisfy the means-end condition for beliefs and desires. This re-
quires that there are certain additional necessary conditions on box-inclusion 
that these aberrant sentences do not satisfy. The formulation of Restrictive 
Version is neutral on what they might be. But the most obvious candidates 
are the constraints mentioned above: the Evidence Constraint and the Desire 
the Good Constraint. The idea is that, since “this stuff tastes bitter and dis-
gusting” is radically incongruent with your experiential evidence, and since “I 
will have this horribly bitter and disgusting stuff in my mouth” is radically 
incongruent with any sane any sane set of intrinsic values, they cannot count 
as being in your belief-box and desire-box. What other features of these aber-
rant sentences in this example might possibly preclude them from being in 
the belief-box and the desire-box? So, the Restrictive Version seems to require 
something like the Evidence Constraint and the Desire the Good Constraint.  
However, there are numerous counterexamples to these constraints. As 
Fodor himself emphasized, even ordinary people without mental illness often 
have extremely “mad” beliefs and desires that go against their evidence and 
“mad” desires that go against any sane set of intrinsic values (1986; 1987, 88-
89). Indeed, he says, “I accept - in fact, welcome - what amounts to the con-
clusion that people can believe things that are arbitrarily mad” (1987, 88). He 
explicitly rejects strong restrictions on box-inclusion.13   
In short, the Restrictive Version holds that the aberrant sentences “this 
stuff tastes bitter and disgusting” and “I will have this horribly bitter and dis-
gusting stuff in my mouth” do not count as being in your belief-box and de-
sire-box, even though interact to cause your behavior in the manner distinc-
tive of beliefs and desires. The trouble is that any constraints on box-inclusion 
that are strong enough to yield that verdict in this case will be overly restrictive: 
they will be undermined by the fact that people have weird beliefs and desires 
in other cases. 
 
4. THE ARGUMENT FORMULATED 
 
The argument can now be put in this way:  
 
 
might avoid the verdict, in the Large Number Case, that you believe that there are exactly 117 
things behind your head. However, Fodor himself, as a staunch opponent of holism, would 
never have accepted the Holistic Inference Constraint (see e. g. 1987, 89). 
 
13 See Dub (2015, 97, fn.5). 
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1. If the inner sentence theory is correct, then either the Liberal Ver-
sion or the Restrictive Version is correct. 
2. The Liberal Version implies secret scrambling, which is unacceptable 
(§2).  
3. The Restrictive Version implies secret losing and in general is overly 
restrictive, which are also unacceptable results (§3).  
4. So the inner sentence theory is mistaken.  
 
Let me explain premise 1. I defined the inner sentence theory as any the-
ory that endorses the basic theory and semantic inertia. The Liberal Version is 
simply defined as any version that combines the inner sentence theory with a 
liberal account of box-inclusion (such as the Means-Ends condition [3]), that 
is, one that implies secret scrambling in my examples. The Restrictive Version 
is defined as any version that combines the inner sentence theory with a re-
strictive account of box-inclusion, that is, one that doesn’t imply secret scram-
bling in these examples. These exhaust the options, because any version of the 
inner sentence theory will either imply, or fail to imply, secret scrambling in 
my examples.  
Therefore, proponents of the inner sentence theory have a choice. They 
must accept either the Liberal Version or the Restrictive Version.  
How might proponents of the inner sentence respond to this argument? 
Should they accept the Liberal Version or the Restrictive Version?  
One response would be for them is to accept the Restrictive Version but 
maintain (contrary to premise 3) that it is acceptable. I myself think that this 
response is a non-starter for the reasons given in the previous section.  
I think Fodor himself would have accepted the Liberal Version, which im-
plies secret scrambling, and would have insisted (contrary to premise 2) that 
secret scrambling is acceptable. As mentioned in the previous section, he said, 
“I accept - in fact, welcome - what amounts to the conclusion that people can 
believe things that are arbitrarily mad” (1987, 88). This suggests that he would 
have also said that their beliefs (and desires) can change in ways that are arbi-
trarily mad. And this in turn suggests a liberal view on which secret scram-
bling is possible. True, this goes against common sense. But Fodor also said 
that “a lot of what common sense believes about the attitudes must surely be 
false” (1987, 15). 
Against the Liberal Version, I have already explained in §2 why I think we 
just know that in these cases your beliefs and desires do not secretly change in 
very irrational ways while all your surface-level experiences and behavioral 
dispositions remain the same. For instance, in the Taste Case, we just know 
that, while are having a wonderfully sweet taste experience of the ice-cream 
and greedily consuming it, it is not the case that you mostly believe it tastes 
sweet and wonderful but for a brief moment you secretly believe it tastes hor-
ribly bitter. Throughout you believe it tastes sweet and you want this sweet 
stuff in your mouth. Even if there is a momentary change in your subpersonal 
neural state, this is better regarded as a case of multiple realizability of the 
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same mental states. And, in the Large Number Case, we just know that you do 
not acquire a belief that is true iff there are 117 things exactly behind you, even 
though you are a primitive hunter-gatherer no experiences of what his behind 
you. You have no idea what is going on behind you! At the very least, these 
verdicts are extremely counterintuitive. And when a theory has many counter-
intuitive consequences, at some point it becomes reasonable to reject it.  
We reject other philosophical theories when they deliver a number of 
counterintuitive verdicts about cases, such as the justified-true-belief analysis 
of knowledge and the description theory of reference. Consistency demands 
that we likewise reject the Liberal Version of the inner sentence theory.  
In my view, then, both the Restrictive Version and the Liberal Version of 
the inner sentence theory are mistaken. Since they exhaust the options, we 
must reject the inner sentence theory altogether.  
 
5. A POSSIBLE MORAL: A SURFACE-LEVEL THEORY OF BELIEF AND DESIRE 
 
Even though I have focused on the inner sentence theory, the target of my 
argument may be more general. My dilemma arises for any theory that en-
dorses two ideas: the inner representation theory of belief and desire (in terms 
of subpersonal representations in a belief-box and a desire-box) and the iner-
tia of meaning. I have focused on the most popular and well-motivated ver-
sion of this theory, the inner sentence theory, which claims that these inner 
representations have combinatorial structure. But the argument may apply 
equally to versions this theory which do not endorse the assumption of com-
binatorial structure.14  
If my argument can be generalized in this way, what theory of belief could 
possibly avoid it? What theory of theory of belief and desire should we put in 
the place of the inner sentence theory of belief and desire?   
In my view, it may be that where the inner sentence theory and kindred 
theories go wrong is in holding that what we believe and desire is fixed by 
hidden representations. Instead, perhaps we should hold that what we believe 
and desire supervenes on more “surface level” facts, such as experiences, dis-
positions to act, interactions with the environment, and acceptance of public 
language sentences. Two subjects (or the same subject at different times) who 
agree in the relevant “surface level” facts must agree in what they believe and 
desire. Examples of this kind of approach include the phenomenal-disposi-
tional theory (Schwitzgebel 2002, 2013), a suitable interpretationist theory (e. 
 
14 For instance, in one version of David Lewis’s “interpretationism”, contents are in the first 
instance assigned to repeatable brain states. This form of the view is developed by Williams 
in a recent book (2020, 5). These brain states may then be “moved around” while retaining 
those contents (“semantic intertia”). Like Fodor’s inner sentence theory, this version runs 
the risk of implying secret scrambling in atypical cases (compare Lewis 1980 on “mad pain”). 
And this is so whether or not it endorses the assumption of constituent structure.  
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g. Lewis 1974, Williams 2016, 2020), and theories appealing to cognitive phe-
nomenology (Mendelovici 2018).15 Because they only appeal to surface-level 
facts, such theories run no risk of allowing for “secret scrambling” or “secret 
losing” in which the surface-level facts remain the same but your beliefs and 
desires radically change.16   
Of course, proponents of such surface-level views must say something 
about Fodor’s justly famous motivations for positing a hidden, inner sen-
tences with constituent structure, for instance, his arguments from systema-
ticity and productivity (Fodor 1987, Quilty-Dunn and Mandelbaum 2018). 
How might a surface-level theory explain systematicity and productivity? 
My aim in this essay has been to develop an argument against the inner 
sentence theory of belief and desire. Here is not the place to develop an alter-
native. But, briefly, I think that proponents of a surface-level theory can an-
swer Fodor’s challenge. In particular, I think we should replace Fodor’s inner 
sentence theory of belief with an outer sentence theory. For individuals like 
ourselves with a public language, a central way of believing that p is by under-
standing and accepting an outer, public-language sentence that means that p. 
Since accepting an outer sentence that means that p (or being disposed to ac-
cept) is a surface-level fact, such an outer sentence theory of belief, unlike 
Fodor’s inner sentence theory, runs no risk of allowing for secret scrambling. 
And such an outer sentence theory might also explain the systematicity and 
productivity of thought (Carruthers 1996).  
Indeed, Fodor (1978) seriously considered such an outer sentence theory 
of belief (calling Carnap’s theory) as a rival to his own inner sentence theory. 
One reason why Fodor ultimately rejected it in favor of his inner sentence 
theory is that individuals (e. g. our prelinguistic ancestors) without an outer 
language can have beliefs. But this particular problem is not decisive. Propo-
nents of the outer sentence theory can answer it by accepting belief-pluralism 
 
15 Here is why I say a “suitable” version of Lewis’s interpretationism. As noted in the previous 
footnote, the state-based version of Lewis’s interpretationism defended by Williams (2010) 
may be subject to my argument about secret scrambling. However, as Williams notes (2020, 
6), another possible version of Lewis’s interpretationism (1974) holistically assigns beliefs 
and desires in the first instance to a subject-at-a-time, namely the ones that best fit “interpre-
tative constraints” given her experiences and behavioral dispositions. Such a version may 
avoid secret scrambling.  
 
16 I have argued that Fodor’s inner sentence theory is inconsistent with a surface level theory 
because in my cases it implies secret scrambling or secret losing even though all the “surface-
level facts” remain the same. I also suggested that Fodor would accept that result. But suppose 
I am wrong. In fact, suppose that some Fodorian theory implies that, in all cases, if the sur-
face-level facts are held fixed, then so are beliefs and desires. Then the Fodorian theory faces 
another problem: it becomes indistinguishable from a surface-level theory! To distinguish 
their theory from surface-level theories, they must allow that beliefs and desires can vary 
while surface-level facts remain the same. And if they can vary while surface-level facts 
remain the same, why not in radical ways, as in my examples? Then we are back to the 
problem of secret scrambling and secret losing.  
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(see e. g. Dennett 1978, 304-309; Bermudez 2003; and Speaks 2010, 234ff). For 
instance, maybe some kind of interpretationism is right for language-inde-
pendent belief. And then, once individuals have an outer language, they have 
another way of believing that p: by understanding and accepting an outer sen-
tence that means that p.17   
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